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Abstract
Combinatorialauctions,whichallowagentstobiddirectlyfor
bundles of resources, are necessary for optimalauction-based
solutions to resource allocation problems with agents that
have non-additive values for resources, such as distributed
scheduling and task assignment problems. We introduce
iBundle, the ﬁrst iterative combinatorial auction that is op-
timal for a reasonable agent bidding strategy, in this case
myopic best-response bidding. Its optimality is proved with
a novel connection to primal-dual optimization theory. We
demonstrate orders of magnitude performance improvements
over the only other known optimal combinatorial auction, the
Generalized Vickrey Auction.
Introduction
Auctions provide useful mechanisms for resource alloca-
tion problems with autonomous and self-interested agents.
Typical applications include task assignment and distributed
scheduling problems, and are characterized with distributed
information about agents’ local problems and multiple con-
ﬂicting goals (Wellman 1993; Clearwater 1996). Auctions
can minimize communication within a system, and generate
optimal (or near-optimal) solutions that maximize the sum
value over all agents.
More recently, electronic commerce has generated new
interest in auction-based systems, both as dynamic mech-
anisms to sell items to individuals, and as systems for
business-to-business transactions. Many retailers have on-
line consumer auctions, e.g. www.onsale.com,and there
are nascent auctions for procurement in the supply-chain,
e.g. www.freemarkets.com. However, at present the
vast majority of online auctions are simple variations on the
traditional English auction, an ascending-price single-item
auction.
We introduce iBundle, an iterative combinatorial auction
that allows agents to bid for bundles of items while the auc-
tioneer increases prices and maintains a provisional alloca-
tion. Bundles are important in many real-world problems:
considera manufacturerthat needs either components A and
B, or just component C; consider a mobile agent that needs
an interval of compute time; consider a train that needs a
bundle of departure and arrival times on tracks across its
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route. Although combinatorial auctions can be approxi-
matedby multipleauctionson single items, thisoften results
in inefﬁcient outcomes (Bykowsky, Cull, & Ledyard 2000).
iBundle is the ﬁrst iterative combinatorial auction that is
optimal for a reasonable agent bidding strategy, in this case
myopic utility-maximizing agents that place best-response
bids to prices. In this paper we prove the optimality of
iBundlewith a novelconnectionto primal-dualoptimization
theory (Papadimitriou & Steiglitz 1982) that also suggests a
useful methodology for the design and analysis of iterative
auctions for other problems.
iBundlehasmanycomputationaladvantagesovertheonly
other known optimal combinatorialauction, the Generalized
VickreyAuction(GVA)(Varian&MacKie-Mason1995). As
an iterative auction, agents can incrementally compute val-
uesfordifferentbundlesofitemsaspriceschange,andmake
new bids in response to bids from other agents. In compar-
ison, the GVA is a sealed-bid auction, in which agents ﬁrst
submit bids simultaneously, and then the auctioneer deter-
mines an allocation and payments. In the GVA an agent’s
optimal strategy is to bid for, and compute the value of, all
bundles for which it has positive value. This is often im-
possible, since for
￿
￿
￿
￿ items there are
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ bundles to value,
each of which may require solving a difﬁcult optimization
problem (Parkes 1999a; Sandholm 1993).
However, combinatorial auctions introduce new compu-
tational complexities in mechanism execution. In particu-
lar, the auctioneer’s winner-determination (WD) problem,
the problem of choosing bids to maximize revenue, is
￿
￿
￿ -
hard by reduction from the maximal weighted clique prob-
lem (Rothkopf et al. 1998).
In iBundle the auctioneer must solve a sequence of WD
problems (one in each round) to maintain a provisional allo-
cation as agents bid. In comparison, in the GVA the auction-
eer must solve one WD problem for each agent in the ﬁnal
allocation. Each WD problem in iBundle is smaller than
in the GVA, because agents bid for less bundles. In addi-
tion, the auctioneer can increase the minimal bid increment
and reduce the number of rounds to termination, reducing
computation for some loss in economic efﬁciency. Further
speed-ups are achieved through caching of solutions from
previousrounds in the auction, and introducing approximate
WDalgorithmsthatmaintainthesameincentivesformyopic
agents to bid truthfully in each round.
We note that the GVA has stronger truth-revelation prop-erties than iBundle. Truthful bidding is optimal in the GVA
whate
￿ ver the bids of other agents. In comparison, ratio-
nal agents with lookahead could manipulate the outcome of
iBundle to their advantage, and lead to suboptimal alloca-
tions. However, there is some evidence that myopic bid-
ding may be a reasonable assumption in practice, perhaps
because of the computational complexityof strategic behav-
ior. For example, in the FCC broadband spectrum auction,
conducted as a set of simultaneous ascending-price auctions
on spectrum licenses, bids were rarely above minimum ask
prices and jump bids were the exception (Cramton 1997).
In Parkes & Ungar (2000) we present a simple extension
to iBundle that makes it robust to strategic manipulation in
several interesting problems; we adjust the ﬁnal prices in
iBundle towards Vickrey prices.
The Ascending-Price Bundle Auction
iBundle is an ascending-price auction that allows agents to
bid on arbitrary combinations of items during the auction.
The auctioneer increases prices on bundles as bids are re-
ceived and maintains a set of winning bids that maximize
revenue.
Let
￿ denote the set of items to be auctioned,
￿ denote
the set of agents, and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ denote a bundle of items. The
auction proceeds in rounds, indexed
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . We describe the
types of bids that agents can place, and the allocations and
price updates computed by the auctioneer.1
Bids. Agents can place exclusive-or bids for bundles, e.g.
￿
￿
￿ XOR
￿
￿
￿ , to indicate than an agent wants either all items
in
￿
￿ or all items in
￿
￿ but not both
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ .2
Agent
￿ associatesa bidprice
￿
￿
￿
￿
!
 
"
$
#
%
’
&
(
￿
*
) with a bidfor bun-
dle
￿ in round
￿ , non-negativeby deﬁnition. The price must
eitherbewithin
+ of,orgreaterthan,theaskpriceannounced
by the auctioneer (see below). Parameter
+
￿
,
.
- deﬁnes
the minimal bid increment, the minimal price increase in the
auction. Agents must repeat bids for bundles in the current
allocation, but can bid at the same price if the ask price has
increased since the previous round.3
Winner-determination. The auctioneer solves a winner-
determination problem in each round, computing an alloca-
tion of bundles to agents that maximizes revenue. The auc-
tioneermust respectagents’ XOR bidconstraints, andcannot
allocate any item to more than one agent. The provisional
allocation becomes the ﬁnal allocation when the auction ter-
minates.
1The iBundle auction has three variations, that differ in their
price update rules (Parkes 1999b). In this paper, we use iBundle
both to refer to the family of auctions in general, and also to varia-
tion iBundle(d), which we describe in detail.
2Exclusive-or bids provide complete expressibility, but are not
necessarily computationally efﬁcient for all problems. We can de-
rive price-update rules for other bid languages (Parkes 1999b).
3An agent can also bid
/ below the ask price for any bundle in
any round— but then it cannot bid a higher price for that bundle in
the future. This allows an agent to bid for a bundle priced slightly
above its value.
Approximate Winner-determination. The auction-
eer can also use an approximate algorithm for winner-
determination, and still maintain the same incentives for
myopic agents to follow the same bidding strategy. To
achieve this an approximate algorithm must have the bid-
monotonicity property:
Deﬁnition 1. Bid monotonicity. An algorithm for winner-
determination satisﬁes bid monotonicity if whenever an
agent
￿ is allocated a bundle with bids
0
% , it is also allo-
cated a bundle with bids
0
%
￿
1
3
2 that include a bid for an
additional bundle
2 .
It is straightforward to prove that optimal winner-
determination algorithms are bid-monotonic.
Prices. The price-update rule generalizes the rule in the
English auction, which is an ascending-price auction for a
single item. In the English auction the price is increased
whenever two or more agents bid for the item at the current
price. In iBundle the price on a bundle is increased when
oneormore agentsthat do notreceivea bundleinthe current
allocationbidat (orabove)thecurrentask pricefor abundle.
Thepriceisincreasedto
+ (theminimalbidincrement)above
the greatest failed bid price. The initial ask prices are zero.
The auctioneer announces a new ask price,
￿
￿
4
’
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&
(
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*
) in
round
￿ , for all bundles
￿ that increase in price. Other
bundles are implicitly priced at least as high as the great-
est price of any bundle they contain, i.e.
￿
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for
￿
;
*
A
￿ . These ask prices are anonymous, the same for
all agents.
Price discrimination. In some problems the auctioneer
introduces price discrimination based on agents’ bids, with
different ask prices to different agents, when this is neces-
sary to achieve an optimal allocation. A simple rule dynam-
ically introduces price discrimination on an agent-by-agent
basis, when an agent submits bids that are not safe:
Deﬁnition 2. Safe bids. An agent’s bids are safe if the agent
is allocated a bundle in the current allocation, or it does
not bid at or above the ask price for any pair of compatible
bundles
￿
￿
￿
$
B
8
￿
￿
￿ , such that
￿
￿
￿
*
C
D
￿
E
￿
G
F
￿
H .
Suppose agent
￿ bids unsuccessfully for compatible bun-
dles
￿
￿ and
￿
￿ in round
￿ . It is still possible that bids for
bundles
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ from two different agents can be suc-
cessful at the prices. Remember that the XOR bid constraint
prevents the auctioneer accepting both bids from agent
￿ .
When an agent’s bids are not safe the agent receives
individual ask prices,
￿
4
8
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6
I
#
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&
(
￿
*
) , in future rounds. Indi-
vidual prices are initialized to the current general prices,
￿
￿
￿
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) , and increased to
+ above the agent’s
bids in future rounds that the agent receives no bundle in the
provisional allocation.
Termination. The auction terminates when: [T1] all
agents submit the same bids in two consecutive rounds, or
[T2] all agents that bid receive a bundle.
A Myopic Best-Response Bidding Strategy
iBundle computes an optimal allocation with myopically ra-
2tional agents that play a best (utility-maximizing) response
to the
L current ask prices and allocation in the auction. The
agents are myopic in the sense that they only consider the
current round of the auction.
Let
M
O
N
8
P
(
Q
@
R denote agent
S ’s value for bundle
Q , and assume
M
N
P
(
T
U
R
*
V
X
W and free disposal of items, so that
M
N
P
(
Q
*
Y
Z
R
>
[
\
M
N
P
:
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*
R
for all
Q
Y
^
]
Q . Consider a risk-neutral agent, with a quasi-
linear utility function
_
‘
N
’
P
(
Q
*
R
a
V
b
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P
(
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R
d
c
f
e
g
P
:
Q
*
R for bundle
Q
at price
e
g
P
(
Q
@
R . Further, assume that agents are indifferent to
within a utility of
h
j
i , the minimal bid increment. This is
reasonable as
i
￿
k
l
W .
By deﬁnition, a myopic agent bids to maximize utility at
the current ask prices (taking an
i discount when repeating
a bid for a bundle in the provisional allocation or bidding
for a bundle priced just above its value). The myopic best-
response strategy is to submit an XOR bid for all bundles
Q that maximize (to within
i ) utility
_
‘
N
8
P
(
Q
*
R at the current
prices. This maximizes the probability of a successful bid
for bid-monotonic WD algorithms.
Theoretical Results
We are now ready to introduce our main theoretical results.
Recall that
m
n
￿
m is the number of items,
m
o
p
m is the number of
agents, and
i is the minimal bid increment.
Theorem 1. iBundle terminates with an allocation that is
within
q
<
r
t
s
v
u
E
w
x
m
n
￿
m
z
y
I
m
o
p
m
|
{
I
i of the optimal solution, for myopic
best-response agent bidding strategies.
The auction is optimal as the bid increment approaches
zero because the error-term goes to zero.
However, iBundle requires price discrimination, and this
can be hard to enforce. For example, the auctioneer
must prevent agents entering the auction under multiple
pseudonyms, and also prevent the transfer of items in an
after-market. In a simpler variation,iBundle(2), the auction-
eer never tests for bid-safety and never price discriminates
betweenagents(Parkes1999b).4 FromTheorem1, thisvari-
ation is optimal at least when bids are safe (this condition is
sufﬁcient but not necessary):
Theorem 2. iBundle(2) terminates with an allocation that
is within
q
*
r
}
s
Z
u
￿
w
~
m
n
￿
m
￿
y
￿
m
o
‘
m
z
{
￿
i of the optimal solution when bids
are safe, for myopic best-response agent bidding strategies.
As an example, bids are safe if each agent bids for a set of
conﬂictingbundlesin everyroundofthe auction. iBundle(2)
also provably solves the following problems without price
discrimination: (1) every agent demands different bundles;
(2) agents have additive or superadditive values, i.e.
M
p
P
(
Q
￿
￿
Q
Y
R
a
[
￿
M
‘
P
:
Q
*
R
<
￿
￿
M
p
P
(
Q
Y
R for non-conﬂicting bundles
Q and
Q
Y ;
(3) the bundles that receive bids throughout the auction are
from a single partition of items, e.g. all bids are for pairs of
matching shoes, or single items.
In experimental tests iBundle(2) performs well in many
hard problems, achieving an average of 99% allocative ef-
4Label 2 refers to “second-degree” price discrimination, non-
linear prices in bundles of items but identical prices across agents
(Bikchandani & Ostroy 1998).
ﬁciency5 (Parkes 1999b) compared to 82% allocative efﬁ-
ciency from non-combinatorial auctions in the same prob-
lems. We found that price discrimination only had a no-
ticeable effect on allocative efﬁciency with very small bid
increments, and after many rounds of bidding.
Proof of Optimality
The proof of iBundle’s optimality is inspired by a proof
due to Bertsekas (1990) for a simpler iterative auction, and
makes an interesting connection with primal-dual theory of
linear programming. It helps to motivate the price-update
rules, the safety condition for introducing price discrimina-
tion, and the conditions for termination.
Primal-dual is an algorithm-design paradigm that is of-
ten used to solve combinatorial optimization problems (Pa-
padimitriou & Steiglitz 1982). A problem is ﬁrst formulated
both as a primal and a dual linear program (see the exam-
ples below for iBundle). A primal-dual algorithm searches
for feasible primal and dual solutions that satisfy comple-
mentary slackness conditions, instead of searching for an
optimal primal (or dual) solution directly. Complementary-
slackness (CS for short) expresses logical relationships be-
tween the values of primal and dual solutions that are neces-
sary and sufﬁcient for optimality:
Complementary-SlacknessTheorem. Feasibleprimaland
dual solutions are optimal if and only if they satisfy comple-
mentary slackness conditions.
iBundle implements a primal-dual algorithm for a linear-
program formulation of the combinatorial resource alloca-
tion problem. It does this without formulating or solving the
primal and dual problems explicitly, but based on informa-
tion in agents’ bids. Remember that the auctioneer does not
know agents’ values for resources.
Proof of iBundle(2)
We ﬁrst prove Theorem 2, the optimality of iBundle(2)
(the variation without price discrimination) in problems for
which agents’ bids are safe. A proof of Theorem 1, the opti-
mality of iBundle in general problems, follows from a sim-
ple transformation between iBundle and iBundle(2).
Figure 1 presents a standard integer program formula-
tion of the combinatorial resource allocation problem. The
objective is to maximize the total value of the allocation,
given value
M
N
P
(
Q
@
R for bundle
Q to agent
S . Integer variables
￿
N
8
P
(
Q
*
R
d
￿
f
w
￿
W
￿
y
!
￿
O
{ indicate whether or not agent
S receives bun-
dle
Q . Constraints (IP-1) ensure that each agent receives
at most a single bundle, constraints (IP-2) ensure that each
item is allocated to at most one agent.
Bikchandani & Ostroy (1998) formulate the combinato-
rial resource allocation problem as a linear program, see
[LP
￿ ] in Figure 2. The integer constraints
￿
N
P
(
Q
*
R
￿
￿
￿
w
I
W
￿
y
￿
￿
O
{
in [IP] are relaxed to
￿
N
’
P
:
Q
*
R
￿
[
￿
W , and new variables
￿
3
￿
￿
￿
are introduced which correspond to a partition of items into
bundles.
￿ is the set of all possible partitions. Constraints
5Allocative efﬁciency is a measure of optimality, computed as
the ratio of the total value of the allocation across all agents to the
value of the optimal allocation.
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Figure1: Combinatorialresourceallocationproblem: Integerpro-
gram [IP] formulation.
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Figure 2: Combinatorial resource allocation problem: Primal lin-
ear program [LP
˚ ] and dual linear program [DLP
˚ ] formulations.
(LP-2) and (LP-3) replace constraints (IP-2), and ensure that
a feasible solution does not allocate more than one of each
item.
Ingeneral, anoptimalsolutiontothelinearprogram [LP
” ]
can allocatefractionalitemsto agents, andneednot bea fea-
sible solution to [IP]. In fact, the optimal solution to [LP
” ]
is integral and solves [IP] if and only if non-discriminatory
bundle prices exist that support the optimal allocation in
competitive equilibrium with best-response agent bidding
strategies (Bikchandani & Ostroy 1998). Competitive equi-
librium implies that agents’ maximize utility and the auc-
tioneer maximizes’ revenue given the ﬁnal prices and the
ﬁnal allocation.
The dual problem, [DLP
” ], to primal [LP
” ] is shown in
Figure 2. Variables
¯
¡
›
£
,
¯
¡
:
¢
*
£
and
˙
correspond to con-
straints (LP-1), (LP-2) and (LP-3) respectively, and dual
constraints (DLP-1) and (DLP-2) correspond to primal vari-
ables
￿
￿
¡
(
¢
*
£
and
‰
¡
(
￿
￿
£
. When the primal solution is integral
the dual problem computes competitive equilibrium bundle
prices that minimize the sum of agent utility and auctioneer
revenue, see (1) and (2) below.
We prove that iBundle(2) implements a primal-dual algo-
rithm for [LP
” ] and [DLP
” ], and computes integral solutions
to [LP
” ] when agents follow myopic best-response bidding
strategies and bids are safe. First, we show that the alloca-
tion and prices in each round of the auction correspond to
feasible primal and dual solutions. Then, we show that the
primal and dual solutions satisfy CS when the auction ter-
minates.
Let
¢
E
￿
denote the provisional allocation to agent
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Feasible dual. To construct a feasible dual solution as-
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. Constraints (DLP-1) and (DLP-2) are
satisﬁed with assignments:
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The value
¯
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can be interpreted as agent
› ’s maximum
utilityattheprices,and
˙
canbeinterpretedasthemaximum
revenue that the auctioneer can achieve at the prices (irre-
spective of the bids placed by agents). The auctioneer does
notexplicitlycompute the value of
¯
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›
£
, rather we provethat
the allocation and prices in the auction satisfy CS with these
assignments when the auction terminates, based on the bids
placed by agents. This is just as well, because the values
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£
remain private information to agents during the auc-
tion.
Complementary-slackness conditions. The ﬁrst primal
CS condition,6 (CS-1) is:
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Given (1) it states that all agents must only receive bun-
dles that maximize utility at the current prices. (CS-1)
is maintained throughout the auction because bundles are
only allocated according to bids from agents, and agents
place best-response bids. Formally, for any bundle
¢
bid
by agent
› : (i)
¯
￿
¸
’
￿
9
˝
¡
:
¢
*
£
￿
￿
￿
ª
»
'
¯
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
ﬁ
￿
¡
:
¢
*
£
￿
'
¯
￿
¸
’
￿
9
˝
¡
(
¢
*
£
; (ii)
⁄
￿
¡
(
¢
@
£
~
￿
¯
￿
￿
￿
￿
ﬁ
￿
¡
(
¢
*
£
￿
˘
D
ª
￿
¿
￿
t
￿
O
￿
￿
Ł
￿
‡
￿
⁄
￿
¡
:
¢
<
—
=
£
~
￿
¯
￿
!
￿
￿
ﬁ
￿
¡
(
¢
<
—
￿
£
￿
￿
because
agents bid for bundles that maximize utility within
ª
; (iii)
⁄
O
￿
￿
¡
(
¢
@
£
*
￿
¯
￿
￿
!
￿
￿
ﬁ
￿
¡
(
¢
*
£
j
¿
￿
·
, because agents only bid for bundles
with positive utility. Since
￿
￿
’
¡
:
¢
￿
￿
¶
£
Ø
˛
Œ
“
implies agent
› bid
for bundle
¢
￿
, we have:
￿
￿
8
¡
(
¢
*
£
d
￿
￿
·
X
￿
Œ
⁄
O
￿
’
¡
:
¢
*
£
^
￿
¯
￿
¸
8
￿
9
˝
¡
(
¢
*
£
g
˘
￿
º
U
ª
￿
¿
￿
J
￿
$
￿
Æ
￿
·
«
￿
J
￿
$
￿
￿
￿
‡
￿
⁄
O
￿
8
¡
(
¢
—
£
^
￿
¯
￿
¸
8
￿
9
˝
¡
(
¢
—
£
„
￿
~
￿
6Complementary slackness states that if a primal variable is
non-zero then its corresponding dual inequality constraint is bind-
ing. Similarly for dual variables.
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The second primal CS condition, (CS-2), is:
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Given (2) it states that the allocation must maximize the
auctioneer’s revenue at prices
￿
g
￿
:
￿
*
￿ , over all possible allo-
cations and irrespective of bids received from agents. We
prove (CS-2) is maintained in all rounds because it is not
binding that the auctioneer must allocate bundles according
to agents’ bids. Through the price-update rules the auction-
eer is able to maximize revenue given prices in every round.
Formally: (i) Agent
æ with one of the highest losing bid
for bundle
￿ in round
￿ will continue to bid for bundle
￿ in
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￿ . A similar argument can be made for the
utility of bundles that the agent did bid in round
￿ ; (ii) No
single agent causes the price to increase to its current level
on a pair of compatible bundles. This follows because price
updates are due to safe bids from agents.
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the constraints to allocate to agents’ bids are not binding.
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an allocation can include no more bundles than there are
agents or items. We prove
œ -CS-2:
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The ﬁrst dual CS condition, (CS-3), is:
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Given (1) it states that every agent with positive utility for
some bundle at the current prices must receive a bundle in
the allocation. (CS-3) is only satisﬁed during the auction
for agents that receive bundles in the provisional allocation,
but we prove (CS-3) for all agents when iBundle(2) termi-
nates. Interminationcase[T2] everyagentthatbids receives
a bundle, so we immediately have (CS-3) with myopic best-
response agents. In case [T1] some agents may bid and re-
ceive no bundles. However,these agents must bid at
œ below
the ask price and have values just below ask prices, other-
wise prices would increase and their bids would change.
Finally, the last pair of dual CS conditions, (CS-4) and
(CS-5), are:
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b trivially satisﬁes the RHS of both conditions.
Termination. By contradiction, assumethe auction never
terminates. Informally,[T1] impliesthat agents must submit
different bids in successive rounds, but with myopic best-
response bidding this implies that prices must increase, and
agents must eventually bid above their values for bundles.
We proveacontradictionwithmyopicbest-responsebidding
strategies.
Putting it all together. Summing
œ -CS-1 over all agents
in the ﬁnal allocation, and with
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the weak duality property of linear programs. Thus, be-
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solution is integral (by construction during iBundle), it is a
feasible and optimal solution to the combinatorial resource
allocation problem [IP].
In addition, it follows immediately that iBundle(2) ter-
minates in competitive equilibrium when agents are myopi-
cally rational and place safe bids.
Proof of iBundle
Asimpletransformationofagents’bidsallowsiBundleto be
implementedwithiniBundle(2)andensuresthatagents’bids
remain safe throughout the auction. Whenever bids from
agent
æ are not safe in iBundle(2) we can simulate the price-
update rule in iBundle by introducing a new dummy item
that is speciﬁc to that agent, call it
s
￿
. This item is concate-
nated by the auctioneer to all bids from agent
æ in this round
and all future rounds. It has the following effects:
1. The outcome of winner-determination, or the allocative
efﬁciency of the auction, is unchanged because no other
agent bids for item
s
￿
.
2. Agent
æ ’s bids are always safe because every bid includes
item
s
￿
, and no pair of bids is compatible.
53. Thepriceincreasesdue tobids fromagent
t are isolatedto
that
u agent in all future rounds because all price increases
are for bundles that include item
v
?
w .
The optimality of iBundle follows immediately from the
optimality of iBundle(2).
Computational Analysis
As an iterative auction, iBundle has manycomputationalad-
vantagesforagentsoverthesealed-bid GVA, aswediscussed
in the introduction. InParkes(1999b) we present resultsthat
demonstrate savings in agent valuation work in iBundle.
However, the winner-determination (WD) problem that
the auctioneer solves in each round of iBundle to compute
the provisional allocation is
x
z
y -hard, just as in the GVA.
The auctioneer must solve one WD problem in each round,
and a naive worst-case analysis gives
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.
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7
￿
\
￿ rounds
to converge,for a total of
} bundles with positive valueover
all agents, maximum value
~
￿
+
￿
￿
￿ for any bundle, and mini-
mal bid increment
￿ . In the worst-case the price of a single
bundle must increase by at least
￿ in each round the auc-
tion remains open, and prices are bounded by the maximum
value over all agents. The number of rounds to termina-
tion is inversely proportional to the minimal bid increment.
The auctioneer can solve less WD problems by increasing
the minimal bid increment, for some loss in economic efﬁ-
ciency.
A number of optimizations are possible within iBundle
to speed-up computation on winner-determination in each
round. First, the provisional allocation from the previous
round provides a good initial solution to the WD problem,
because agents must re-bid bundles received in the previ-
ous round. This allows pruning of the search for a revenue-
maximizing allocation. An additional saving in computa-
tion time is achieved by limiting search to an allocation at
least
￿ better than the value of the allocation in the previous
round. Moreover, although each intermediate WD problem
in iBundle may be intrinsically more difﬁcult than each WD
problem in GVA because all agents bid at similar prices for
bundles (Andersson et al. 2000), the problems are typically
much smaller than in the GVA.
The auctioneer only announces price increases in each
round, and need not maintain explicit prices for all possible
bundles. Bid prices are veriﬁed dynamically in each round,
to check that bids are at least as large as the ask price of
all contained bundles. With a simple sorted-list implemen-
tation, the total work in checking each bid is linear in the
number
y of bundles that have explicit ask prices. Simi-
larly, prices can be maintained in linear-time in
y for each
new price increase. In addition,
y
Z
￿
￿
} , with agents that
havevaluesfor
} bundles,becauseonly bundlesthatreceive
bids can receive explicit ask prices.
Experimental Results
We compare the computation and communication cost of
iBundle with the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA).
We consider problems Decay, Weighted-random (WR),
Random and Uniform from Sandholm (1999). Each prob-
lem deﬁnes a distribution over agents’ values for bundles of
items, with XOR valuation functions, such that agents want
at most one bundle. In our main experiments the number of
items,
￿
￿
M
￿
‘
￿
￿
￿
7
￿ , and we scale the problems by increasing
the number of agents from 5 to 40, with values for 10 bun-
dles per agent. We set Sandholm’s parameter
￿
￿
￿
q
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿ in
Decay, and select bundles of size 10 in Uniform.
Resultsare presentedfor iBundle(2),the auctionvariation
without price discrimination. A variation on Sandholm’s
depth-ﬁrst branch-and-bound search algorithm (Sandholm
1999)solveswinner-determination(WD)in each round, and
computesthe allocationand prices in the GVA. We introduce
a new heuristic to make search more efﬁcient for XOR bids.
Theheuristiccomputesanoverestimateofthepossiblevalue
ofa partial allocationbased on allocatingat most one bundle
to each remaining agent without a bundle.
In addition, we measure the performance of iBundle with
a greedy approximate winner-determination algorithm due
to Lehmann et al. (1999) that satisﬁes the bid-monotonicity
property (Deﬁnition 1).
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Figure 3: Total computation time in iBundle(2), the GVA, and a
sealed-bid auction with truthful agents, in problem set Decay. The
performance of iBundle is plotted with different bid increments
￿ ,
selected to give allocative efﬁciency of 80%, 85%, 95% and 99%.
Figure 3 plots the total auctioneer winner-determination
and price-update time7 in iBundle in the Decay problem set.
Performance is measured for different bid increments, with
the bid increment selected to give allocative efﬁciency of
80%, 85%, 95% and 99% (
￿
p
￿
￿
￿ ). Figure 3 also plots per-
formance for the GVA, and for a sealed-bid auction in which
agents are assumed to bid truthfully.8 Results are averaged
over 10 trials. First, note that the curves are sublinear on the
logarithmic value axis as the number of agents increases,
7Time is measured as user time in seconds on a 450 MHz Pen-
tium Pro with 1024 MRAM, with iBundle coded in C++.
8The GVA proved intractable for 30 and 40 agents. In those
problems the run time is estimated as the time to compute the opti-
mal solution in a single WD problem multiplied by the number of
agents in the optimal allocation.
6indicating polynomial computation time in the number of
agents.
￿
The performance improvement of iBundle over GVA is
striking, achieving at least one order of magnitude improve-
mentwith99%allocativeefﬁciencyandthreeordersofmag-
nitude with 85% allocative efﬁciency. For up to 95% efﬁ-
ciency we essentially get the myopic truth-revelation prop-
erties of iBundle for free, because iBundle’s run-time is
approximately the same as for the sealed-bid auction with
truthful agents.
Problem GVA iBundle Approx-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Bundle
Decay Eff (%) 100 91.5 94.9 98.3 85.1
67.3%
￿ WD-time
￿ (s) 41700 831 2400 5650 0
13.4
￿ Pr-time
¡ (s) – 26 34.5 44 39.2
Comm
¢ (kBit) 18.8 221 306 394 377
WR Eff (%) 100 90.7 94.9 99.2 79.4
71.5% WD-time (s) 3 0.6 1.7 6 0
1 Pr-time (s) – 5.4 11.5 40.9 12.2
Comm (kBit) 18.1 20.5 52.1 144 53.1
Rand Eff (%) 100 89.3 97 99 95.8
37.8% WD-time (s) 68 4.4 7.4 11 0
11.2 Pr-time (s) – 6.5 9.7 12.1 12.9
Comm (kBit) 18.7 49.5 66.4 82.6 85.6
Unif Eff (%) 100 – 95.6 99.1 76.2
58% WD-time (s) 25 – 6.6 18.7 0
3 Pr-time (s) – – 14.7 42.0 46
Comm (kBit) 18.2 – 56.5 120 124
Table 1: Performance in the Decay, WR, random, and uniform
problems.
￿ Auctioneer WD time.
¡ Price-update time.
¢ Commu-
nication cost.
￿ Alloc. eff. of a sealed-bid auction with a greedy
WD algorithm and truthful agents.
￿ Average number of agents in
the optimal solution.
Table 1 compares iBundle with the GVA for all Sand-
holm’s problems, for problems with 30 agents. With our
parameters the WR and Uniform problems are quite easy
because the optimal allocation sells large bundles to a few
agents, which allows considerable pruning during search.
The Random and, in particular, Decay problems tend to
be harder because the optimal allocation requires coordina-
tion across a number of agents, see also Sandholm (1999)
and Andersson et al. (2000). In all problems iBundle has
less WD time at 95% allocative efﬁciency than the GVA.
Note that price-update is relatively expensive in the oth-
erwise easy weighted-random (WR) problem, because bid
prices for large bundles must be checked for price consis-
tency against the price of all included bundles.
There is a communication cost9 penalty in using iBundle
compared with the GVA in these problems (Table 1) because
of repeated bids across a number of rounds. This would
9We assume that bids and price information in iBundle must
only specify a bundle, because bids are usually at the current ask
price, and ask prices only increase by the minimal bid increment.
We also assume a broadcast network infrastructure for price up-
dates. A bundle is speciﬁed with
£
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¥
£ bits. In the GVA a bid
speciﬁes both a bundle and a value. We assume that values re-
quire 10 bits, enough to specify a value to 3 signiﬁcant ﬁgures
(
ƒ
h
§
￿
¤
B
'
￿
“
4
«
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
‹
$
￿
«
￿ .)
change in problems with agents that have values for many
bundles because all values must be reported in the GVA, or
in easier problems because iBundle will terminate quickly
with less bids.
The performance of iBundle with the greedy WD algo-
rithm is noteworthy: iBundle performs well in the hard De-
cay problem set, with allocative efﬁciency 85.1%, giving at
least a 1000-fold reduction in WD time. We believe that
other, slightly less greedy, approximate algorithms will give
even further performance improvements.
Speeding up iBundle In addition to using the allocation
from the previous round to prune search, it is also useful to
cache all previous provisionalallocations and select the best
cached allocation as an initial solution for WD. A simple
linear program is used to select the best allocation from the
cache, and requires negligible computation. In our main tri-
als we use a cache size of 1, i.e. take the solution from the
previous round as an initial solution to the WD problem.
Problem WD Time % Cache
0 1
›
›
ﬂ
ﬁ Correct
Decay 50/15/150
￿ 415 371 355 291 0 28 47 59
WR 50/50/1000 253 243 231 163 0 11 57 57
Rand 50/30/600 1823 1616 1491 864
￿ 0 6 30 78
Unif 50/40/800 343 337 336 110 0 14 29 49
Table 2: Winner-determination time with caches of size 0, 1 (last
round), and
› (all previous rounds). In cache
›
ﬂ
ﬁ revenue maximiz-
ing cached solutions from previous rounds are assumed optimal.
Eff
–
￿
C
￿
￿
￿ in all problems except
￿ , where Eff
†
￿
￿
‡
B
·
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
£
⁄
¥
£ /
£
¶
U
£ / # bundle values.
Table 2 compares the WD time in each problem with
and without caching of previous allocations. Although a
full cache can provide an additional speed-up over using
no cached solutions, or just the allocation from the previ-
ous round, the effect is not very dramatic. The reason is that
it remains expensive to verify that a cached solution is opti-
mal. For example, although an extended cache in the Decay
problem provides the correct allocation in 47% of problems,
the speed-up is limited to around 14%.
In an attempt to leverage the correct solutions from the
cache, we tested the performance of iBundle under an ad-
ditional assumption that if a cached solution from before
round
•
,
‚
”
„ generates more revenue than the solution from
round
•
￿
‚
»
„ , this is adopted as the new provisional alloca-
tion without further computation. The rule is designed to
capture “ﬂip-ﬂop” competition between a number of good
allocations during an auction.
Labeled
…
￿
‰, the rule provesuseful in Decay, WR and Uni-
form, reducingcomputationby 30%, 36%and68% from the
time with no cache for a negligible drop in allocative efﬁ-
ciency. However, one must be careful: although we also see
a speed-up in Random, the allocative efﬁciency falls from
¿
B
¿
.
￿
to
¿
B
`
U
￿
ˆ
.
￿
. Further analysis shows that cached solutions
prove optimal in 54%, 97% and 49% of rounds in Decay,
WR and Uniform, but only optimal 34% of rounds in Ran-
dom.
Further optimizations should be possible, for example
7using cached solutions once a large enough cache is con-
structed,
˜ and solving WD when an auction is about to ter-
minate with cached solutions. Another useful approach is
¯ -scaling, that adjusts the bid increment during an auction
(Bertsekas 1990).
Related Work
Rassenti et al. (1982) describe an early single-round combi-
natorial mechanism for airport slot allocation, while Banks
et al. (1989) describe AUSM, an early iterative bundle auc-
tion. AUSM has no explicit price-update rules, and agents
must solve hard problems to bid effectively. DeMartini et
al. (1998) describe, RAD, an iterative extension of Rassenti
et al., also with linear prices. No optimal properties have
been proved for any of these auctions in general problems.
The AkBA (Wurman 1999, chapter 5) auctions are con-
ceptually similar to iBundle, but have different price-update
rules and no price discrimination. AkBA shares many of
iBundle’s computational properties, but is not known to be
optimal for any reasonable bidding strategy.
Therehavebeenanumberofproposalstoreducethecom-
putational costs of combinatorial auctions while maintain-
ing incentives for truth-revelation; e.g. limit the types of
bundles that agents can bid for (Rothkopf et al. 1998); or
introduce an approximate solution for winner-determination
(Lehmann et al. 1999), but little success in designing good
auctions for general bundle problems. Moreover, most pre-
vious work focuses on sealed-bid auctions.
Conclusions
iBundle is a new iterative combinatorial auction that is opti-
mal for myopically-rational agents. As an iterative auction,
iBundle is particularly useful when agents have hard local
valuation problems because it allows agents to compute es-
timates of the value of different outcomes incrementally, in
response to bids from other agents. We proved iBundle’s
optimality within a primal-dual framework, which we be-
lieve will provide a useful conceptual basis for the design
and analysis of iterative auctions for other problems.
It remains expensive to compute optimal solutions with
iBundle in manyproblems, because the auctioneer’swinner-
determination (WD) problem is
˘
z
˙ -hard. We suggested a
number of techniques to reduce computation, possibly for
some loss in allocative efﬁciency, for example: increase the
bidincrement,usecachedallocations,and introduceapprox-
imate winner-determination algorithms. We demonstrated
orders of magnitude performance improvements over the
GVA, the only other known optimal combinatorial auction,
in some hard problems.
In future work we plan to test iBundle in some real prob-
lems, and experiment with additional bid restrictions and al-
ternative approximate WD algorithms. An interesting open
problem is to adapt iBundle for two-sided markets, with
multiple buyers and sellers.
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